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RESPONDENT'S BRIEF 
STATEMENT OF THE NATURE OF THE CASE 
The respondent, as a court reporter, sues for a determination 
of her status as a State Merit System employee. 
DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT 
The Honorable Stewart M. Hansen, Jr., one of the judges of 
the Third Judicial District Court, in and for Salt Lake County, State 
of Utah, ruled that, as a matter of law, the respondent, as a court 
reporter for many years in the Third Judicial District, was a covered 
Merit System employee. The Court reserved for a trial the issue of 
damages sustained by the respondent as a result of her dismissal. 
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STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Respondent, for many years, has served as a court reporter 
in the Third Judicial District Court. At the request of the The 
Honorable Merrill C. Faux, the respondent acted primarily as his 
reporter. After the enactment of the mandatory retirement law, Judge 
Faux was required to take retirement on December 31, 1972. Thereafter, 
the respondent was discharged as a court reporter in January 1973 by 
The Honorable D. Frank Wilkins, District Court Judge and Court Admini-
strator. Thereafter, the respondent attempted to have the Merit System 
Council consider her dismissal, and to grant her the statutory rights 
of a Merit System employee. The Merit System Council refused to con-
sider her case. 
The instant action was then commenced in the District Court 
of Salt Lake County for a determination of the Merit System status of 
the respondent and, after the matter was presented to The Honorable 
Stewart M. Hanson, Jr., he ruled that, as a matter of law, the respon-





THE DISTRICT COURT WAS CORRECT IN ITS RULING THAT 
COURT REPORTERS ARE MERIT SYSTEM EMPLOYEES, BASED 
UPON THE AMENDMENT TO THE MERIT SYSTEM ACT BY THE 
LEGISLATURE IN 1971. 
The^Legislature of the State of Utah enacted the Merit 
System for state employees during the 1965 term of the legislature. 
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At that time, they specifically exempted certain classes of employees 
from coverage under the Merit System, and in particular exempted 
employees of the judiciary from coverage. Utah Code Annotated, 
67-13-6(a)(8) states: 
ff(a) Except as otherwise provided by law or 
by rules and regulations promulgated hereunder for 
federally aided programs, the following positions 
shall be exempt from the merit provisions of this 
act: 
(8) All members and employees of the judiciary 
of the State of Utah and the Attorney General of the 
State of Utah, and his staff and District Attorneys 
and their staffs.fl 
In 1971, the Legislature amended the Merit System Act, and 
under the exemptions provisions, deleted what had previously been 
subsections (8) which exempted employees of the judiciary of the State 
of Utah from coverage under the Merit System, and enacted certain new 
sections. In particular, Title 67-13-6, Utah Code Annotated, had a 
subsection (g) added which states: 
"All employees of the office of Secretary of 
State, the office of State Auditor, the office of 
State Treasurer, the office of Attorney General 
(excluding attorneys), and employees of the judiciary 
who are not exempt by the provisions of this section, 
shall be covered by the provisions of the Merit 
System." 
(emphasis added) 
As the amendment affects "employees of the judiciary1', it is 
clear that the Legislature had the specific intent to place "employees 
of the judiciary" under the Merit System of the State of Utah. Prior 
to the 1971 amendment, "employees of the judiciary" were specifically 
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exempted from coverage, whereas, by the 1971 amendment, they were 
specifically included in the Merit System. 
The appellant, in an attempt to show a continued exclusion, 
refers to part of another subparagraph of Title 67-13-6, Utah Code 
Annotated, but in doing so refers only to that part of that subsection 
that aids its cause. The subsection referred to, namely, Subsection 
(4) of Paragraph (a) of Title 67-13-6, Utah Code Annotated, deals with 
a specific exemption as did Subsection (8) of that title prior to the 
1971 amendment. The appellant would ask the Court to believe that the 
Legislature spoke of employees of the judiciary in both Subparagraph 
(4), and then again in Subparagraph (8). Logical statutory constructioi 
would weigh heavily against that contention. 
In Subparagraph (4), relied upon by the appellant, there is 
a specific need for affirmative action to be taken, and that is the 
portion of the subparagraph that the appellant failed to list in its 
brief. For reference the respondent sets out that subsection of 
Title 67-13-6 (a), Utah Code Annotated, for a full consideration as 
follows: 
"(4) Those employees who make final policy 
decision, including all heads of department, agencies 
and major offices; those heads of subordinate units 
whose duties have a direct and substantial effect 
on the public relations of the State Administration 
generally; those employees whose regular duties in-
clude public advocacy in defense of administration 
policy; and those in a personal and confidential 
relationship to elected officials and to heads of 
departments, agencies, and other major offices. All 
positions so designated as being exempt shall be 
listed in the rules and regulations promulgated 
under this act by the job title and department or 
mmmmmmmmmmmm 
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agency, and any change in such exempt status, shall 
constitute an amendment to said rules and regulations.ff 
The obvious reason for the appellant's omission of the last 
sentence of the foregoing paragraph is the fact that some affirmative 
action on the part of the Merit System Council was necessary to exempt 
people who would fit within the classification of persons designated 
in that subparagraph, and obviously court reporters are not on that 
list. 
The appellant goes on to state in its brief that "clerks and 
reporters of the court'1 have such a confidential relationship with the 
judges for whom they work that they must be covered by Subparagraph (4), 
Court clerks are, however, Merit System employees under the county 
Merit System provided for by Title 17-13-1 et. seq., Utah Code Annotatec 
and there are no exemptions from the county Merit System for court 
clerks, and court clerks are Merit System employees. 
The appellant then seeks to find refuge in the provisions of 
Title 78-56-1.1, Utah Code Annotated, which is the part of the code 
dealing with court reporters and stenographers. That provision states: 
"The court administrator shall appoint a 
certified shorthand reporter with the approval of 
the district judge to report the proceedings in 
each division of the district courts. The certified 
shorthand reporter shall hold office during the 
pleasure of the court administrator and the district 
judge." 
The appellant relies upon that statute in an attempt to 
establish a confidential relationship that would place court reporters 
under the provisions of Title 67-13-6 (a)(4), making the court reporter 
mm 
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such an office that has personal and confidential relationship. How-
ever, once again, the appellant fails to read all of Subsection (4), 
and particularly that part that requires all such positions so desig-
nated as being exempt to be listed in the rules and regulations promul-
gated under the act by the job title and department or agency where 
the exemption is to be honored. 
The appellant would then ask the court to distinguish the 
statutes and hold that Title 67-13-6, Utah Code Annotated, is a general 
statute, and that Title 78-56-1.1, Utah Code Annotated is a specific 
statute. What makes general general and specific specific? Is not the 
1971 amendment to Title 67-13-6, Utah Code Annotated, specific? Does 
it not specifically enumerate a new section or group of employees that 
shall be covered under the Merit System of the State of Utah? Does it 
not specifically state that employees of the judiciary shall be covered 
by the provisions of the Merit System? 
The appellants distinction between a general statute and a 
specific statute is a fictional distinction, and nothing more. 
Respondent agrees with the statement of law contained on 
Page 8 of the appellant's brief, citing from two Utah cases, namely, 
in re Utah Savings and Loan Association, 21 Utah 2d 169, 442 Pacific 
2d 929 (1968); and University of Utah vs. Richards, 20 Utah 457, 59 
Pacific 96 (1899). The respondent further believes that the two 
statutes that the appellant claims are in conflict can be reconciled, 
and that a reasonable construction can be given to both. If, however, 
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the court believes they cannot be reconciled, and that reasonable 
construction cannot be given to both, then the court has, on at least 
two prior occasions, ruled that the statute passed later in time 
governs and is controlling over the earlier statute. 
The Utah Supreme Court in Pacific Intermountain Express 
Company vs. State Tax Commission, 7 Utah 2d. 15, 316 Pacific 2d. 549, 
where the court states: 
n
'
WoVAlso supporting this view are the 
basic rules pertaining to statutory construction. 
That, in case of conflict, a later enactment is 
controlling over an earlier one; and that express 
provisions of statutes take preference over 
general ones.!f 
To the same effect, see Nelden vs. Clark, 20 Utah 382, 
59 Pacific 524; and Bateman vs. Board of Examiners of the State of 
Utah, 7 Utah 2d. 221, 322 Pacific 2d. 381. 
Title 78-56-1.1, Utah Code Annotated, properly gives the 
court administrator and each individual district judge the right to 
appoint a court reporter to a district court judge to meet his satis-
faction and desire. That principle does not, however, conflict with t 
tenure of a court reporter to serve as a Merit System employee of the 
State of Utah. Even before the Merit System Act was amended in 1975 
to include court reporters, it was apparently the court administrator1 
position that the provisions of Title 78-56-1.1 were to allow job 
security for reporters who became members of a court reporter pool, 
yet allowing each district judge to select from the pool the court 
reporter he desired. By letter on Supreme Court stationery dated 
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November 13, 1969, by L.M. Cummings, as court administrator, and 
approved by The Honorable A.H. Ellett, assignment justice (R.15), the 
court administrator stated: 
"Under former law, a judge hired his court 
reporter who served during the pleasure of the 
judge. This law was very unfair to a reporter who 
had established his home and maintained a standard 
of living in the community, for when his judge died, 
the reporter was not continued on the payroll and 
could not be paid by the state of Utah. The law has 
now been amended so that the reporters are all hired 
by the court administrator who consults with the 
judge and has the judge's permission before hiring 
a reporter for the particular judge. However, in 
case of death of the judge, the reporter still works 
for the state of Utah, and is entitled to his salary. 
He, likewise, is subject to be called by the court 
administrator into different courts when he is not 
working for his judge." 
Even before the 1971 amendment to the Merit System Act in 
which court reporters were placed under the Merit System, and inter-
pretation had been given to the Court Administrator Act and, particu-
larly Section 78-56-1.1, declaring a policy of tenure for court 
reporters so that they would not be left out in the cold with the 
death of their judge. Thereafter, the Mandatory Retirement Act for 
judges was passed, and the retention of court reporters on payroll 
of the state of Utah became even more important; because their status, 
under prior law, could have been changed by either of two events; 
namely, the death of their judge or the retirement of their judge. 
The two statutes in question can be reconciled, in that the 
Merit System Statute gives court reporters Merit System status 
and the Court Administrator Act gives the court administrator the 
m 
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authority to control the work of the court reporters, the judge for 
whom they shall work (with that judge's approval), and the fixing of 
their vacations, and the like. They are employees of the State of 
Utah under the Merit System, but are subject to the control of the 
court administrator for the promotion of better judicial administration. 
If the acts can be reconciled; then, by all means, they 
should be, and it is submitted that the foregoing reconciliation is a 
feasible one. If they cannot, however, be reconciled, then the most 
recently passed statute governs; and the 1971 amendment to the Merit 
System Act takes precedence over the 1969 enactment of the Court Admin-
istrator Act. 
II. 
THE APPELLANT CANNOT TAKE REFUGE IN ITS DERELICTION 
OF DUTY IN FAILING TO HAVE THE RESPONDENT CERTIFIED 
UNDER THE SYSTEM. 
The appellant asks that the District Court's judgment be 
reversed because it, the appellant, failed to follow the mandate of 
the Legislature in either discharging the respondent before she was 
sandwiched into the Merit System, or certifying her into the Merit 
System. 
In dealing with that direct question at the trial court 
level, the following dialogue went on between Judge Hansan and the 
appellant's attorney on Pages 14 and 15 of the reporter's transcript 
of hearing as follows: 
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"THE COURT: Let's assume, just for the purpose 
of argument, that Subparagraph (g) , amendment to 
67-13-6, did, in fact, place court reporters under 
the Merit System. That would have occurred in 1971, 
or May of 1971. Now, the date that the particular 
employee falls within the class covered, goes under 
the Merit System, would be as of that date, would it 
not? 
MR. NELSON: Yes. Then again, under the rules 
and regulations, there would have been a particular 
time in which they had to be certified, if, in fact, 
they were covered or intended to be covered. 
THE COURT: All right. Now, letfs assume 
again that court reporters were intended to be covered, 
but that no certification was made for any reporter 
at that time or any time thereafter. Now, does this 
mean that in spite of the intention of the Legislature, 
that employee can be dismissed in a manner contrary to 
the provisions of the Merit System. 
MR. NELSON: No, your Honor. I believe that 
all that was done or was not done in this particular 
case was under the theory that they were not covered. 
If this court, or the highest court of this state were 
to say that they were covered under statute, I believe 
that this would have to be followed through. And again, 
the time element somehow would have to be prolonged, the 
department would still have to, I think, affirmatively 
take some action on it. In direct answer to your ques-
tion, if it were determined that they were covered in 
that original act of the Legislature in 1971, I believe 
it would be our position that surely they would be given 
the opportunity to come in. But I think again, from all 
that has taken placie, and all that has not taken place, 
it would indicate, at least, that there was either no 
intention, or someone was not interested, or at least 
some four years had gone by and the Legislature surely 
should be given the enlightenment that they have cer-
tain laws on the books; and, if they wanted to change 
them as the court reporters are not now under the 
System, they could have done something about it. I 
think so. I think again under construction, if we 
have got something that has been a condition for some 
period of time, not hid under a bushel of some kind, 
to think that the Legislature had the intention that 
these particular court reporters should be under it, 
I think would be stretching far beyond the practice 
showed. 
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THE COURT: Thank you. Anything further 
Mr. Bennett? 
MR. BENNETT: I think, in a nutshell, what 
the State's position is, is that if we did not do 
it after the Legislature told us to do it the first 
time, they had a duty to come back and tell us to 
do it a second time; and I just don't think that is 
tenable 
The State, on appeal, somewhat abandons the position they 
took in the District Court of saying that the Legislature should have 
reenacted the 1971 amendment because the Merit System Council did not 
take the necessary action to certify court reporters into the system, 
and point out that there are certain certification procedures under 
the statute that possibly should have been followed. In that regard, 
they cite Title 67-13-6 (b)(2) and (3). Those particular provisions, 
as cited by the appellant in its brief, have reference particularly 
to Schedule C which states as follows: 
MThe non-competitive schedule, consisting 
of all positions for which it is not feasible to 
administer competitive examinations at entry. 
Following satisfactory completion of at least a 
year probationary period, employees under this 
schedule shall receive tenure.M 
Inasmuch as the Merit System Council did not take affirmative 
action to declare the court reporters on a competitive schedule, it 
can only be assumed that they were considered to be on a non-competitive 
schedule for which the administration of examinations was not necessary. 
Therefore, upon completion of one year in service after the 1971 
amendment became effective in May of 1971, the court reporters would 
have received tenure, which would have been in May, 1972, The respon-
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dent continued to hold her position until January, 1973, several 
months after she would have received tenure. 
The State has not raised the defense, either in their 
pleadings or in their contentions, that the respondent was anything but 
a very efficient and competent court reporter. Their position is 
primarily that the appellant failed to follow their own procedures 
to certify court reporters into the Merit System and, by doing so, 
were able to defeat the legislative mandate. If that were the case, 
and if they were allowed to profit by their own inaction, then the 
legislative branch of government of the State of Utah might just as 
well be disbanded because some administrative department head has an 
absolute right to veto the legislative enactments of the State of 
Utah. That cannot be the law under our republican form of government. 
The only Merit System regulations relied upon by the 
appellant are those referred to on Page 14 of their brief, which are 
dated December 1, 1973, and which are apparently still in effect. The 
problem with those regulations is that they were passed many months 
after the respondent was discharged from her position in January of 
1973. The appellant cannot claim the benefit of regulations passed 
long after their misdeed. 
CONCLUSIONS 
The District Court was correct in ruling that the respondent 
was, on January 31, 1973, a covered employee under the Merit System 
Act of the State of Utah, which, through its amendment in 1971, with 
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the changes in Section 67-13-6 (a)(8), and the changes and additions 
in Section 67-13-6 (g), incorporated official court reporter serving 
the district courts in the State of Utah and to the Merit System of 
the State of Utah; and that, from the effective date of that act in 
May, 1971, court reporters, serving in the district courts, became 
covered employees under said Merit System, and the District Court's rulin 
should be adopted by the Supreme Court. 
Respectfully submitted, 
^jJj~JUtliL. <~/L~J3fc~ 
WENDELL E. BENNETT 
At torney for Respondent 
Su i t e 100, John Hancock Bui ld ing 
455 South 300 East 
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